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ABSTRACT 
 
According to Ian Hacking, some human kinds are subject to a peculiar type of classificatory instability: 
individuals change in reaction to being classified, which in turn leads to a revision of our understanding 
of the kind. Hacking’s claim that these ‘human interactive kinds’ cannot be natural kinds has been 
vehemently criticised on the grounds that similar patterns of instability occur in paradigmatic examples 
of natural kinds. I argue that the dialectic of the extant debate misses the core conceptual problem of 
human interactive kinds. The problem is not that these kinds are particularly unstable but ‘capricious’—
their members behave in wayward, unexpected manners which defeats existing theoretical 
understanding. The reason for that, I argue, is that human interactive kinds are often ‘hybrid kinds’ 
consisting of a base kind and an associated status, which makes mechanisms that support patterns of 
change and stability systematically difficult to understand and predict.  
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1  Introduction 
The question whether the human world can be studied in the same way as the natural 
world has given rise to several heated controversies over the last two centuries. On the 
one side, proponents of the ‘unity thesis’ argue that investigation of the human world 
ought to be modelled closely on our scientific methods for the investigation of the 
natural world. On the other side, proponents of the ‘difference thesis’ defend the idea 
that the human world is importantly different from the natural world, and therefore 
requires methods fundamentally different from those of the natural sciences. Today, 
this highly polarised characterisation looks somewhat outdated. For better or worse, 
grand claims about the nature of ‘the natural’ as opposed to ‘the human’ sciences have 
given way to a more nuanced investigation of specific scientific disciplines and 
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approaches. Accordingly, the idea that the investigation of the human world requires 
a fundamentally different approach to that of the natural sciences has become a 
minority view in philosophy of science.  
One of the last spokespersons of this view is Ian Hacking. For Hacking, the special 
status of the human sciences lies with the kinds they study: while the kinds that figure 
in the natural sciences are independent of (or, in Hacking’s word, ‘indifferent to’) 
scientists’ classificatory practices, some human kinds interact with the classifications 
scientists are using. Hacking terms these kinds human ‘interactive’ kinds and makes 
two controversial claims about them: (i) only human kinds are interactive kinds; (ii) 
human interactive kinds cannot be natural kinds. Both claims have been vehemently 
criticised—the first on the grounds that there seem to be non-human interactive kinds; 
the second on the grounds that, even if the phenomenon of interactivity could be 
limited to human kinds, this would not prevent them from being natural kinds. Despite 
finding Hacking’s detailed case studies insightful, critics have converged on the 
conclusion that the general account of human interactive kinds which he extracts from 
them should be rejected.  
This paper aims to challenge this consensus. I argue that, although the critics 
correctly identify weaknesses in Hacking’s argument, their focus on Hacking’s 
suggestion that human interactive kinds are ontologically unstable fails to recognise 
the core conceptual problem of human interactive kinds. Accordingly, a shift in focus 
is due. I argue that we should stop understanding the question whether human 
interactive kinds can be natural kinds as hinging on the issue of ontological stability. 
Instead, we should focus on the role of understanding mechanisms that support 
patterns of change and stability in our epistemic practices surrounding natural kinds. 
Pace Hacking’s critics, considering human interactive kinds from this perspective 
potentially undermines their status as natural kinds, which has not been acknowledged 
in the extant discussion and merits further investigation. 
In the following section, I recapitulate the extant discussion between Hacking and 
his critics. In Section Three, I point out how the dialectic of this discussion centres on 
the issue of ontological stability over time. I discuss two reasons why this way of 
framing the debate is misguided. Firstly, it cannot account for the epistemic problems 
posed by human kinds that participate in stabilizing, as opposed to destabilizing, 
feedback effects. Secondly, it is based on an oversimplified account of the scientific 
investigation and use of natural kinds. If these observations are correct, the assumption 
that human interactive kinds are problematic because their objects are unstable is 
wrong and has led the discussion astray. In Section Four, I develop an alternative 
understanding of human interactive kinds as hybrid kinds consisting of a base kind and 
an associated social status. I argue that such kinds pose specific difficulties for scientific 
understanding, which suggests some caution in thinking of them as natural kinds.  
 
2  The Extant Discussion 
2.1  Hacking’s account of interactive kinds 
Hacking’s account of interactive kinds is motivated by a number of detailed case 
studies of psychiatric kinds like multiple personality disorder, child abuse, and 
schizophrenia (see Hacking [1986], [1988], [1991], [1992], [1995a]). Hacking notes that 
the studied phenomena develop over time in a very peculiar way that is unknown to 
the natural sciences. The objects of classification ‘interact’ with the classificatory 
schemes that are used to investigate them: classified individuals change, sometimes up 
to the point where the original classification is considered obsolete and thus revised. 
He calls these kinds ‘interactive’ (or ‘looping’) kinds. Phenomena studied in the natural 
3 
 
sciences, by contrast, are unresponsive to our classificatory practices. Quarks, to use 
Hacking’s familiar example, do not change in response to how we classify them.  
We can understand the underlying process as a two-phase feedback loop. In the 
first phase, individuals react to the classifications that are (potentially) applied to them 
by changing their behaviour and characteristics. This phenomenon has been described 
in the sociological literature on criminal behaviour under the name ‘labelling theory’ 
(see, for instance, Schur [1971]). However, Hacking’s account of interactive kinds 
features a second phase which has not been discussed in labelling theory. He suggests 
that the changes brought about by labelling can be so extensive as to render the original 
classification obsolete. Due to labelling effects, individuals might no longer correspond 
to the criteria or theoretical associations of the original classification. Upon noticing 
this development, those in charge of the classification (for instance scientists or 
politicians) may decide that the mismatch is serious enough to necessitate a revision of 
the definition or theoretical understanding of the classification. Hence, in the second 
phase, the change in individuals’ behaviour or characteristics feeds back into the 
understanding of the classification used to describe them.  
Hacking’s ([1999], pp. 113–4) discussion of the changing symptom profile of 
schizophrenia provides a good illustration of this process. He describes two iterations 
of the feedback loop, each of which features the two phases described above. 
According to Hacking, when the diagnosis of schizophrenia was first introduced, 
experts emphasised ‘flat affect’ and considered auditory hallucinations a minor 
problem that was not specific to schizophrenia. Auditory hallucinations being such an 
‘unproblematic’ symptom, large numbers of people classified as schizophrenic 
expressed and reported them to their doctors. As a result, auditory hallucinations were 
found to be universal among schizophrenics when the classification was 
operationalised about thirty years later, and were therefore established as a major 
diagnostic criterion. This is the first iteration of the feedback effect. A second iteration 
occurred as schizophrenia became a decreasingly ‘fashionable’ diagnosis that 
individuals tried to avoid. Individuals stopped reporting auditory hallucinations; 
auditory hallucination ceased to be a widespread characteristic of people diagnosed 
with schizophrenia, and was successively de-emphasized as a diagnostic criterion. 
Hacking makes two controversial claims about interactive kinds. He argues (i) that 
only human kinds are interactive kinds and (ii) that human interactive kinds are not 
natural kinds. Some clarifications are in order before we proceed to the criticism of 
Hacking’s account. First, although Hacking often seems to refer to human kinds in 
general, he is not committed to saying that all human kinds are interactive. To avoid 
confusion, I will refer to those human kinds which are subject to the feedback effects 
described above as ‘human interactive kinds’. Second, given the controversy about the 
concept of natural kinds, we need to know what concept is at issue in this discussion. 
Hacking’s ideas about natural kinds are sketchy and—including kinds like mud (see 
[1995b], p. 352)—unusually permissive.1 Hacking’s critics recognise this, but argue that 
there is a substantial question as to whether human interactive kinds can be natural 
kinds according to more orthodox understandings of natural kinds that include 
biological species as paradigmatic examples (see, for instance, Boyd [1991]; Dupré 
[1993]; Millikan [1999]). I put aside for now the larger debates about what natural kinds 
are and whether species qualify, and simply accept the critics’ assumption that species 
are paradigmatic natural kinds. I will come back to the account of natural kinds 
underlying this debate in Section Three. 
 
                                                 
1 In later work, Hacking ([2007]) distances himself from the notion of natural kinds altogether, arguing that the concept 
has outlived its usefulness. 
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2.2  Classificatory feedback in non-human kinds 
Hacking’s claims have been subject to extensive criticism. Critics have invoked a 
variety of non-human kinds which allegedly participate in the same feedback effects as 
human interactive kind, including kinds of bacteria, marijuana plants, and livestock 
(Douglas [1986]; Bogen [1988]; Cooper [2004]). The most detailed case has been made 
with respect to domestic dogs (Khalidi [2010], pp. 345–6). According to Muhammad 
Khalidi, research suggests that the process by which the species domestic dog diverged 
from wolves consists of many iterations of the two-phased feedback effect described 
above. In the first phase, individuals classified as tame were selectively bred, producing 
increasingly tame individuals over time. In the second phase, upon recognising that 
extant individuals do not conform to the existing classification of them, humans 
revised their classifications (for instance from wolf to domestic dog, and later from 
domestic dog to particular dog breeds). These examples are not only used to reject 
Hacking’s first claim that only human kind can be interactive, but are frequently taken 
to challenge his second claim that human interactive kinds cannot be natural kinds. As 
Rachel Cooper ([2004], pp. 74–7) points out, many of these examples qualify as natural 
kinds not only on Hacking’s own, somewhat idiosyncratic account, but on many non-
essentialist accounts of natural kinds that accommodate species as paradigmatic 
examples. Accordingly, it looks like the classificatory feedback effects that Hacking 
identifies as unique to human kinds in fact produce similar patterns of ontological 
instability in paradigmatic examples of natural kinds This would imply that both of 
Hacking’s claims are false. 
Hacking’s staple response to this objection is to insist that the examples above do 
not qualify as interactive kinds on his view because the objects in question lack 
awareness of their classification (see, for instance, Hacking [1997], p. 15). Critics have 
pointed out a number of problems with this response. First of all, if awareness of one’s 
classification is a necessary feature of interactive kinds, some of Hacking’s own 
examples no longer qualify. Hacking ([1995b], p. 374) suggests that although young 
children and individuals with severe autism might be unaware of how they are 
classified, they might nevertheless participate in classificatory feedback that involves ‘a 
larger human unit, for example the family’. The idea seems to be that individuals who 
are unaware of how they are classified might nevertheless respond to the classification 
indirectly, for instance by responding to family members or caretakers who are aware 
of how the individual is classified. This implies that awareness of one’s classification is 
not a necessary feature of interactive kinds. 
Second, it has been argued that even if Hacking would consistently restrict his 
account of interactive kinds to kinds whose members are aware of their classification, 
he has trouble explaining why these kinds cannot be natural kinds. While change in 
reaction to becoming aware of one’s classification might be specific to humans, it is 
not clear how this makes human interactive kinds different from the examples of 
natural kinds discussed above. According to Cooper ([2004], p. 79), in order to make 
this claim, Hacking would have to assume that classificatory feedback via awareness is 
of ‘greater metaphysical significance’ than the classificatory feedback we find in other 
kinds. Khalidi ([2010], p. 352) makes the same point with respect to feedback effects 
that are generated phylogenetically, via selective breeding. He argues that Hacking 
provides no reason why these phylogenetic feedback effects do not have the same 
philosophical implications as feedback effects that are created ontogenetically, via 
awareness. 
In other words, both critics agree that even if Hacking stipulatively restricted the 
concept of interactive kinds to kinds whose members are aware of their classifications, 
he would still have to face two challenges. First, he would have to exclude some of the 
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examples he previously described as interactive kinds from that category. Second, and 
more importantly, he would still owe a justification for the claim that human interactive 
kinds cannot be natural kinds. If Hacking wants to use the notion of interactivity to 
defend the idea of a fundamental difference between the human sciences and the 
natural sciences, an ad hoc emphasis on awareness will not do. Instead, so the critics 
suggest, he has to point to an ontological peculiarity of human interactive kinds that 
disqualifies them as natural kinds. Otherwise, his argument that human interactive 
kinds cannot be natural kinds fails. I will suggest that these objections, although 
correct, are somewhat beside the point: their focus on an ontological facet of Hacking’s 
account (instability over time) obscures the main conceptual problems of human 
interactive kinds. To show this, we need to discuss the premises of the above criticism 
in more detail, beginning with the underlying account of natural kinds. 
 
3  Natural Kinds and Ontological Instability 
What, if anything, could prevent human interactive kinds from being natural kinds? 
The critics’ comparison of human interactive kinds with biological kinds suggest that 
the difference—if there is one—has to be ontological. This assumption is reflected in 
Khalidi’s question whether human interactive kinds are ‘real’, as well as in Cooper’s 
concern with whether classificatory feedback really marks ‘a fundamental metaphysical 
distinction’ between human interactive kinds and natural kinds. However, when we 
look at how both critics frame their investigation, a different aspect emerges. Cooper 
motivates her discussion with reference to the central epistemic role that natural kinds 
play in scientific inquiry: 
 
If human kinds are natural kinds then this suggests that accounts of laws, explanations, 
and the basis of sound inductive inferences, developed for the natural sciences, can be 
carried across into the human sciences. If human kinds are not natural kinds, then this 
will be a reason for thinking that distinct accounts will be required. ([2004], p. 84) 
 
Similarly, Khalidi ([2010], p. 358) suggests that we should consider human interactive 
kinds as real, via adopting ‘a weak realist view that considers as real any kind that plays 
an indispensable role in explaining phenomena, making successful predictions, and 
otherwise featuring in successful inductive inference’. Both remarks suggest that the 
guiding motivation of the debate is not purely metaphysical interest, but the question 
whether human interactive kinds can fulfil the epistemic role of natural kinds.2 The 
critics’ concern with the status of human interactive kinds as natural kinds is effectively 
an epistemological and methodological one: if human interactive kinds are natural 
kinds, we do not need to come up with radically new approaches to understand them—
their investigation can simply be modelled on the methods and epistemic practices 
used in the natural sciences. This hope stands in sharp contrast with some of Hacking’s 
remarks. He suggests that any attempt at investigating human interactive kinds in the 
same way as natural kinds is destined to fail, and that more suitable approaches are yet 
to be invented (see, for instance, Hacking [1997]). Against this background, we can 
understand the rejection of Hacking’s account as an attempt to reassure us that the 
phenomenon Hacking describes is not as epistemically troublesome as he makes it out 
to be. To evaluate Hacking’s claims, we need to understand what could possibly hinder 
human interactive kinds from being scientifically investigated and epistemically used 
in the same way as natural kinds.  
                                                 
2 Cooper and Khalidi develop these accounts in more detail elsewhere (see Cooper [2005], Chpt. 2, [2007], Chpt. 4; 
Khalidi [2013]). 
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On many occasions, Hacking suggests that the problem with using human 
interactive kinds as natural kinds has to do with the fact that they are unstable. In 
Hacking’s words, human interactive kinds are ‘on the move’ or ‘moving targets’ (see, 
for instance, Hacking [1999], Chpt. 4, [2006]). This idea resonates with the example of 
schizophrenia discussed in Section Two. There, it seemed that by classifying 
individuals as schizophrenic, investigators unleashed a process in which the classified 
individuals change until they no longer fit the original classification. The resulting 
epistemic problem seems to be described most clearly with respect to the kind child 
abuse. Here, Hacking suggests that there might not be ‘a stable object […] to have 
knowledge about’ ([1995a], p. 61). The idea seems to be that members of human 
interactive kinds constantly change in virtue of feedback effects, and we are not able 
to acquire knowledge and make inductive inferences about objects which constantly 
change over time. Accordingly, Hacking’s critics have focussed on instability as a 
potential problem for human interactive kinds’ status as natural kinds. Khalidi, for 
example, suggests that human interactive kinds seem to pose an epistemological 
problem because ‘after successive iterations of the looping effect, it seems that we may 
no longer be dealing with the same thing we started with’ ([2010], p. 342). 
In other words, the debate is essentially about whether the members of human 
interactive kinds are unstable in a way that precludes them from functioning 
epistemically as natural kinds. Hacking seems to affirm this claim. His critics reject the 
claim on the grounds that similar patterns of instability are not considered a problem 
in the many examples of non-human kinds presented above. Neither side of this 
debate, however, seems to consider the association between ontological stability and 
the epistemic role of natural kinds worthy of further scrutiny. In the following, I 
discuss two reasons for questioning this assumption. Firstly, it is based on an account 
of natural kinds as vectors for projections and generalisations that is oversimplified. 
Secondly, it cannot account for the epistemic problems posed by human kinds that 
participate in stabilizing, as opposed to destabilizing, feedback effects. 
 
3.1  Understanding instability 
In order to bring into focus the assumptions about the relation between ontological 
stability and the epistemic features of natural kinds that form the background of the 
above discussion, we need to specify what kind of instability is considered a potential 
threat to natural kind status, and why. For that purpose, we first need to specify what 
sort of change we are talking about. As described above, there are two sorts of change 
involved in the classificatory feedback that characterises human interactive kinds. 
There can be changes to the members of a kind, for instance when the extension of 
the kind changes (new members join, extant members lose membership or cease to 
exist), or when the characteristics of the individuals within that extension change 
(members acquire new properties or shed old ones). Alternatively, there can be a 
change in the theoretical beliefs associated with the kind, such as when we discover 
new properties of the members and adapt our theoretical understanding to 
accommodate these. Although participants in the debate occasionally talk of kinds 
themselves ‘changing’ or ‘being unstable’, this terminology should be avoided because 
it is ambiguous between these two quite different processes: the change of members 
is something that happens in the world, the change of theoretical understanding is 
something we deliberately bring about. What participants in the debate mean when 
they talk of a kind being ‘unstable’ is that the members of the kind change in ways that 
require us to alter our existing theoretical understanding of the kind. 
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Note that not just any type of change among members constitutes this sort of 
instability. Change is abundant in the natural world and scientists understand, explain, 
and predict the behaviour of a great variety of objects which change over time, such 
as reactive chemical compounds, or animals that undergo metamorphosis. Take the 
kind water (H2O). We know a lot about the properties of this kind, for example that it 
has a melting point of 0 °C and a boiling point of 100 °C. However, we do not think 
that these properties are fixed or absolute, but know that they change depending on 
atmospheric pressure. Accordingly, natural kinds can have properties which are 
theorized as changing under specific circumstances, just as the melting point and 
boiling point of water are theorized as changing relative to atmospheric pressure. 
Therefore, what we mean when we say the natural kind water is stable is not that 
instances of water do not change under differing circumstances. We mean that, over 
time, instances of water do not change or develop new properties that are at odds with 
our existing scientific understanding of water. This suggests that we need to be more 
precise when asking whether ‘instability’ prevents a kind from functioning as a natural 
kind category. The problem with human interactive kinds is not merely that the 
classified objects change, but that they change in ways which are unforeseen by our 
extant theoretical understanding of the kind. This is not the case for chemical 
compounds like H2O. 
The case is different for biological kinds like species. Here, existing members of a 
kind are constantly replaced by new members with slightly different properties. As a 
result, the set of properties that characterises members of a species can be transformed 
over time—instances of domestic dog today are characterised by very different 
properties than instances of domestic dog 200 years ago. Hence, instances of a species 
can, in a sense, change properties in a way that is at odds with our existing 
understanding of the species at any given point. When critics liken the instability of a 
human interactive kind like schizophrenia to the instability of biological kinds like 
domestic dog, what they have in mind is this instability over time of the set of 
properties associated with a kind. The rich biological literature on species like domestic 
dog suggests that biological kinds are quite capable of facilitating prediction, 
explanation, and inductive inference, and thus epistemically qualify as natural kinds. 
Since members of human interactive kinds seem to change over time in much the same 
way as biological kinds, Hacking’s critics conclude that it is implausible to claim that 
the latter can have natural kind status whereas the former cannot. They anticipate that 
Hacking might respond by arguing that members of human interactive kinds change 
at a significantly higher rate than members of biological kinds, and cannot have natural 
kind status for that reason. However, Cooper and Khalidi dismiss this point fairly 
quickly (Cooper [2004], p. 79; Khalidi [2010], p. 350). They argue that even if it was 
evidently true that the members of human interactive kinds change faster than those 
of non-human kinds—which they doubt—this would not by itself explain why human 
interactive kinds cannot be natural kind categories. The difference is, after all, only one 
of degree. 
But at this point, it seems like the critics’ metaphysical concerns with natural kinds 
have gotten ahead of their underlying epistemic motivations. It might be plausible to 
argue that a gradual difference in the rate of change cannot establish a metaphysical 
difference between human interactive kinds and natural kinds. However, given the 
motivating epistemic concern with natural kinds, the dismissal seems somewhat hasty. 
From an epistemic perspective, the claim that human interactive kinds function as 
natural kinds because they change too quickly deserves serious consideration. After all, 
it seems perfectly reasonable to assume that a classification’s ability to facilitate 
inductive inferences that allow us explain the behaviour of past instances and predict 
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the behaviour of future ones depends crucially on how much its objects have changed 
in the meantime. A defender of Hacking could develop this point further by arguing 
that an epistemically significant threshold lies between the rates of change of members 
of biological kinds and those of human interactive kinds: while members of biological 
kinds change slowly enough for our scientific understanding to catch up, members of 
human interactive kinds outrun our efforts to theorise about them. Ron Mallon 
([2016], Chpt. 7) explores this idea in some detail.3 According to Mallon, whether we 
can have knowledge about a human interactive kind depends on whether scientists 
manage to increase the accuracy of their theories about members of the kind at a higher 
rate than the rate at which the members change. I call this the ‘hare-and-tortoise’ 
account of scientific understanding. Mallon illustrates this account in the case of 
biological species, arguing that scientists 
 
can have knowledge of members of these changing kinds that allows us to engage in 
successful induction, prediction, explanation, and intervention because our capacity to 
gain accurate knowledge of these kinds can (sometimes) be far more rapid than the 
processes that underwrite biological change. ([2016], p. 166) 
 
Certain aspects would need to be addressed further to develop this idea into a solid 
argument—for instance how to operationalize rates of change and rates of theory 
improvement in a way that allows us to compare the two. But instead of doing that, I 
want to draw attention to the limitations of the accounts of natural kinds and scientific 
understanding that underpin this line of argument. 
To begin with, the hare-and-tortoise account might suggest that there is an inverse 
relationship between the objects’ rate of change on the one side, and our ability to 
develop scientific understanding of them as natural kinds on the other: the more idle 
the objects of inquiry, the better they can be studied and function as natural kinds. 
However, there are reasons to think that change at a very slow pace poses problems 
of its own. Picking up Mallon’s example of species, it would not be far-fetched to 
suggest that the slow rate at which most readily observable species evolve has hindered 
our understanding of evolution. If horses and birds had the generation time of bacteria, 
we might have arrived at a theory of evolution, and hence a better understanding of 
the natural kinds horse and bird, at a much earlier point in human history. Change at 
a very slow rate tends to escape our attention and if this happens, we fail to incorporate 
this aspect into our theoretical understanding of the kind. Admittedly, the relative 
stability of the members of many species has epistemic advantages: we can make a 
great number of predictions and inductive inferences about members of the kind, 
precisely because change occurs at a rate slow enough as to not interfere with them. 
However, our inductive inferences across wider time spans will be susceptible to error, 
and our explanations will lack information on phylogenetic history and evolutionary 
mechanisms. Overall, we would be inclined to say that, without these, our knowledge 
of the kinds in question is highly incomplete at best.  
The example above shows that a slow rate of change of the members of a kind is 
by no means sufficient for the kind to facilitate scientific understanding. Other 
examples suggest that a relatively slow rate of change is not necessary for acquiring 
scientific understanding either. Consider bacteria. For some strains of bacteria, an 
individual can within thirty hours grow into a population in which every single base 
                                                 
3 Interestingly, Mallon uses this proposal to defend rather than challenge the claim that human interactive kinds can 
function as natural kinds. He suggests that we should expect human interactive kinds to often develop at a slower rate 
than the theories we formulate to explain them, because stabilizing feedback tends to be more prevalent and powerful 
than destabilizing feedback (see [2016], pp. 173-181). 
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pair in the genome has mutated thirty times.4 It seems unlikely that scientific theories 
about bacteria really approach accuracy at a faster rate than that. Fortunately, scientists 
working on these organisms do not start out from scratch, but can draw on theoretical 
resources from other areas. For example, much of the knowledge applicable to bacteria 
is derived from the study of species which change at a less breath-taking speed, such 
as fruit flies. Additionally, experimental setups can be used to limit possible causes of 
change and to ease the process of tracking members of a specific strain without having 
to identify each bacterium on the basis of shared characteristics, as was achieved by 
the development of the pure culture method in microbiology (see O’Malley [2014]).  
These arguments suggest that the hare-and-tortoise account that motivates the 
focus on instability is overly simplistic. Scientists’ ability to improve the accuracy of 
their theories does not simply stand in inverse relationship to the studied objects’ rate 
of change, but depends on a host of factors, such as the possibility of making relevant 
observations, the ability to draw on existing understanding of underlying mechanisms, 
and the opportunity to study objects under laboratory conditions. Accordingly, when 
deciding how well human interactive kinds can fulfil the epistemic role of natural kind 
categories, all these factors need to be taken into consideration. This point has not 
been explicitly addressed in the extant discussion on human interactive kinds, which 
focusses mainly on stability.  
 
3.2  The problem of stabilizing feedback 
The second problem with focussing on ontological instability as a crucial feature of 
natural kinds is that this view cannot account for the epistemic challenges posed by 
human classifications which are stabilized, rather than destabilized, by classificatory 
feedback. Hacking tends to focus on case studies where classificatory feedback makes 
individuals ‘outgrow’ existing classifications, such as the example of schizophrenia 
discussed above. Call this type of classificatory feedback ‘destabilizing’ feedback. 
However, there is a second type of classificatory feedback—‘stabilizing’ feedback—
which achieves the contrary result: labelling effects reinforce properties associated with 
a classification, which is then interpreted as support for the existing classificatory 
practice. Standard examples in labelling theory describe such a process. They suggest, 
for instance, that the fact that someone has been labelled a criminal plays a role in their 
engaging in further criminal behaviour (see, for instance, Lemert [1951]; Becker [1963]; 
Chiricos et al. [2007]; Worrall & Morris [2011]). If the confirming labelling effects of a 
particular category are powerful enough, members of the category will generally 
conform to the properties associated with the category to a higher degree than they 
would have had, had they not been labelled. In response, those in charge of the 
classification might interpret the fact that individuals fit their labels so neatly as 
confirmation of the classificatory practice. In keeping with Hacking’s metaphor, we 
might say that human kinds which are subject to stabilizing feedback are ‘held in place’ 
rather than ‘sent on the move’.  
For someone who believes that ontological instability is the main threat to human 
interactive kinds’ status as natural kinds, stabilizing and destabilizing feedback effects 
need to be treated radically differently. While destabilizing feedback prevents human 
kinds from being natural kinds, stabilizing feedback would presumably make them 
more suitable candidates for natural kind status. After all, if natural kind categories 
need to refer to stable objects in order to facilitate induction, explanation, and 
prediction, and stabilizing feedback provides us with such stable objects, it should 
enable at least some human interactive kinds to function as natural kinds. Dominic 
                                                 
4 See Pray ([2008]). 
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Murphy ([2006], pp. 267–70) makes an argument along these lines. He suggests that if 
the norms, social pressures, stereotypes, or medical opinions that facilitate stabilizing 
feedback persist over time, the resulting patterns of behaviour that characterise a 
human interactive kind might ‘freeze in place’, thus making the kind perfectly suitable 
for inductive inferences. Accordingly, a proponent of the view that ontological 
instability is the main threat to natural kind status would have to hold one of the 
following claims: (i) the concept of human interactive kinds includes only kinds which 
are subject to destabilizing feedback, or (ii) the concept of human interactive kinds also 
includes kinds which are subject to stabilizing feedback, but this does not commit us 
to saying that the latter cannot be natural kinds. While Hacking’s position on the matter 
is not entirely clear, from an epistemological perspective, both of the above claims 
should be rejected.5 The reason for this is that the epistemic challenges posed by 
stabilizing feedback can be substantial, and are in some respects more detrimental to 
the acquisition of scientific knowledge than the challenges associated with destabilizing 
feedback.  
The debate on the causes of differences between men and women is a notorious 
case in point. As already noted in John Stuart Mill’s The Subjection of Women, the crux in 
this debate is that, for many observed behavioural or psychological differences 
between men and women, we have trouble identifying whether they are due to ‘nature’ 
or due to ‘society’—in other words, whether it is due to natural, biological differences 
between men and women or due to differences in social upbringing and differential 
social constraints and opportunities. If the latter factors play a role (as we now have 
plenty of evidence to believe), it is very compelling to think of men and women as 
human interactive kinds that are subject to stabilizing feedback effects. We can imagine 
the underlying two-part feedback mechanisms operating in the following way: In the 
first part, individuals are born into a society that has certain preconceived ideas about 
men and women (for instance that there are natural differences between them which 
not only determine their distinct morphological features, but also differences in 
character, abilities, and preferences). The society socialises individuals and arranges 
social institutions in accordance with these preconceived ideas. As a result, individuals 
classified as men or women continuously encounter differential social expectations and 
constraints and, over time, develop behaviour patterns, character traits, and abilities 
suitable to their circumstances—they come to fit their classification. In the second 
part, the fact that individuals classified as men or women squarely conform to these 
preconceived understandings is interpreted as evidence for the adequacy of the existing 
classificatory practice and its theoretical associations. It looks like men and women do 
naturally differ in character, ability, and preferences. This feedback mechanism is 
iterated as scientific testimony to the existence of such natural differences between 
men and women emerges. Scientific testimony strengthens the associated labelling 
effects, which is again, in turn, interpreted as confirmation of the classificatory practice 
and the theoretical understanding that underpins it. Due to these classificatory 
feedback effects, scientists came to firmly understand men and women as natural kinds 
that facilitate explanation and prediction not only of anatomical features, but also of a 
broad range of behavioural and psychological characteristics. 
Assuming that this story is more or less accurate, we can see how stabilizing 
feedback effects not only obscured and facilitated the oppression of women, but also 
                                                 
5 Hence, I am not suggesting here that Hacking’s critics are guilty of misinterpretation by wrongly attributing to him 
either (i) or (ii). At least with respect to (i), careful readers will find passages that support it, as well as passages that 
undermine it (see [1999], p. 34 versus. [1995b], pp. 369-70).  
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contributed to an erroneous understanding of the kinds men and women.6 Many 
explanations facilitated by this understanding have been either false or substantially 
incomplete. Moreover, since the theoretical understanding suggested that differences 
between men and women are largely invariable across different societies, predictions 
and inductive inferences made on its basis were unreliable. In other words, the example 
above suggests that human kinds which are subject to stabilizing feedback can make 
for very poor natural kinds. 
But more than that, there is reason to believe that human kinds which are subject 
to stabilizing feedback are, in some respects, worse candidates for natural kind status 
than human kinds which are subject to destabilizing feedback. Destabilizing feedback 
is, in some sense, transparent. The fact that classified phenomena resist and undermine 
our classificatory practices rubs our nose in the fact that the classifications we are using 
are based on an inadequate understanding of the phenomena in question. Stabilizing 
feedback, by contrast, is opaque. The apparent success of our classification can lull us 
into a false sense of security about the adequacy of the theoretical understanding that 
underpins the classificatory practice. If these observations are correct, and stabilizing 
feedback is at least as, and arguably more, epistemically challenging than destabilizing 
feedback, the assumption that human interactive kinds are problematic because their 
objects are unstable is wrong. Instead, the case of gender differences suggests that the 
problem is down to an inadequate understanding of the underlying determinants of 
change and stability in members of the kinds—only when we understand the 
mechanisms that support patterns of change and stability among the members of a 
kind are we in a position to provide accurate explanations and make inductive 
inferences across a variety of contexts.  
 
3.3  Summary 
Putting together the observations from the previous sections, the assumed connection 
between ontological stability and the epistemic features of natural kinds starts to look 
rather fragile. Section 3.1 suggests that the focus on ontological stability reflects an 
overly simplistic hare-and-tortoise account of scientific inquiry and natural kinds. The 
case of stabilizing feedback in Section 3.2 corroborates these findings. It suggests that 
using ontological stability as a chief criterion for natural kind status may leave us with 
an epistemically thin and potentially misleading understanding of the kinds in question. 
Fortunately, it also indicates where a more nuanced understanding can be found: our 
epistemic practices surrounding natural kinds require knowledge of the causal 
processes that support patterns of change and stability in the classified objects. In order 
to be able to explain, predict, and make inductive inferences about the behaviour of 
members of a kind, we not only need to know that members typically display certain 
patterns, but also what produces them. In other words, natural kind categories should 
be understood not simply as vectors for projections and generalisations, but as analytic 
tools that incorporate assumptions about the causal mechanisms which constitute the 
kind.  
These insights apply neatly to the example of domestic dog we started out with. 
Proponents of the hare-and-tortoise account suggest that domestic dog qualifies as a 
natural kinds because change in the set of properties associated with this kind occurs 
at a pace slow enough for our understanding to ‘catch up’ and produce accurate 
explanation and predictions. The discussion above suggests that something different 
                                                 
6 This is not to say that stabilizing feedback alone is responsible for the poor epistemic outcome. Other factors, such 
as bias on the part of an overwhelmingly male research community, have arguably played an important role (see, for 
instance, Longino [1990]).  
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is going on. It suggests that domestic dog is a natural kind because we understand 
sufficiently well the evolutionary mechanisms by which members of the kind change 
their characteristics over phylogenetic time. Hence, while changes in the set of 
properties associated with this kind might, in one sense, overhaul our existing 
understanding of domestic dog—dogs in 200 years will probably look very different 
from dogs today—it is, in a different sense, perfectly in accord with our existing 
understanding. By contrast, if Hacking’s description of the historical development of 
schizophrenia is correct, the reason we are taken aback by the instability of the set of 
properties associated with schizophrenia is that we have a wrong or incomplete 
understanding of the causal processes that support it. In other words, in trying to 
understand whether human interactive kinds can be natural kinds, we ought to stop 
putting so much emphasis on stability and instead ask if there is anything about these 
kinds that hampers our efforts to understand the underlying causal processes. In the 
following section, I argue that considering human interactive kinds from this 
perspective provides some reasons to be cautious about their status as natural kinds, 
thus rendering Hacking’s account more convincing than his critics acknowledge. 
  
4  Capricious Kinds 
What, then, is the problem with human interactive kind, if not unusual instability? I 
suggest that the problem has to do with their peculiar ontological structure. Human 
interactive kinds tend to have a dual nature: while we commonly think of human 
interactive kinds in terms of the properties that explicitly define the category, they can 
also be understood in terms of the social position that individuals occupy in virtue of 
being recognised as members of the category. In other words, human interactive kinds 
are often ‘hybrid kinds’—they consist of what I call a ‘base kind’, constituted by the 
properties that define the category, and an associated ‘status kind’, constituted by the 
social position that individuals acquire qua being recognised and treated as members 
of the specific category.  
The example of men and women from the previous section is useful to illustrate 
this idea. It is one of the few cases where the dual nature of a hybrid kind has been 
comprehensively conceptualised, in the form of the sex/gender distinction. Feminists 
have historically used the sex/gender distinction to tackle the idea that differences 
between men and women are biologically determined (see Mikkola [2017]). Roughly 
speaking, the distinction between sex and gender was meant to distinguish differences 
in biology (‘sex’) from differences that are due to culture and society (‘gender’). 
Terminologically, this distinction is sometimes expressed by using ‘male’/’female’ to 
refer to sex categories, and ‘men’/’women’ to refer to gender categories, although I do 
not adhere to this terminology, but instead use ‘men’ and ‘women’ in the theoretically 
naïve sense that makes no such explicit distinction.7 While there are many ways to spell 
out the idea of gender (for instance in terms of gender identity, or socialised 
behaviour), the understanding which is relevant to my idea of a hybrid kind is best 
captured by the feminist slogan ‘gender is the social meaning of sex’. This slogan 
expresses the idea that gender is a social position or role that individuals occupy in 
virtue of being recognised as members of a specific sex, an idea which has been 
developed in much detail by Sally Haslanger ([2012]) and Asta Sveinsdottir ([2011], 
[2013]). As a social position, gender is characterised by the norms, expectations, 
privileges, constraints, and opportunities that apply to individuals qua being recognised 
as members of a certain sex. In my terminology, sex is the base kinds, and gender 
                                                 
7 See Saul ([2006]) for an argument that ordinary speakers do not distinguish sex from gender.  
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(understood as a social position) the associated status kind. As Asta ([2013]) argues in 
detail, the relationship between membership in the base kind and membership in the 
status kind is of a special and somewhat fragile nature—members of the base kind 
come to occupy the social position that characterises the status kind only if they are 
recognised as members of the base kind, and individuals who are wrongly believed to 
be members of the base kind might nevertheless come to occupy the associated social 
position. Although this relationship does not guarantee complete coextension of the 
base kind and the status kind, the properties of the base kind and the properties of the 
status kind are associated reliably enough to suggest that the terms ‘men’ and ‘women’ 
refer to hybrid kinds—they are commonly understood as, and often succeed in, 
distinguishing people on the basis of biological characteristics, yet they also unwittingly 
track an associated distinction in terms of social position.8 On this account, the 
distinction between sex and gender can be understood as an attempt to conceptualise 
the hybrid nature of the human categories men and women, with ‘sex’ denoting the 
base kind and ‘gender’ the associated status kind. 
While Haslanger and Asta use this perspective primarily to develop a detailed 
metaphysical understanding of gender and other status kinds, I am more interested in 
what it tells us about the prospect of using human interactive kinds as natural kinds. I 
think the classificatory feedback effects described by Hacking can be understood as 
feedback effects between a base kind and the respective status kind. By being classified 
as members of a human category defined in terms of  certain base properties, 
individuals come to occupy a specific social position (become members of the 
corresponding status kind) that is characterised by specific norms, expectations, 
constraints and opportunities, and that influences how others relate to them as well as 
how classified individuals relate to themselves. In virtue of these features, membership 
in the status kind can affect the characteristics of classified individuals, which may 
stabilize or destabilize our theoretical understanding of the base kind. In the remainder 
of the paper, I argue that understanding human interactive kinds as hybrid kinds should 
make us wary about treating them as natural kinds. The reason for this is that hybrid 
kinds are susceptible to two problems which complicate their functioning as natural 
kinds: (i) biased conceptualisation, which theorises about the base kind whilst 
disregarding the status that is imposed onto members of the base kind; and (ii) 
difficulty conceptualising, explaining and predicting the social status that is associated 
with a base kind.  
 
4.1.  Biased conceptualisation 
Biased conceptualisation describes a phenomenon by which we theorise about and 
investigate the base of a hybrid kind while paying little attention to the associated 
status. The argument in Section 3.2 suggests men and women had been conceptualised 
in a biased manner before the distinction between sex and gender was introduced. 
Similarly, reconsider Hacking’s paradigmatic example of schizophrenia. Schizophrenia 
is commonly understood either in terms of a specific symptom profile, or in terms of 
an underlying neurological condition that is assumed to produce these specific 
symptoms (Murphy [2006]). Yet the category schizophrenia also picks out a status 
kind, which is a specific position in a network of social relations that individuals occupy 
in virtue of being classified as schizophrenic. Hacking’s discussion details how people 
diagnosed as schizophrenic are singled out for particular interactions and treatments, 
                                                 
8 Note that Haslanger and Asta would probably disagree with this characterisation—they suggest that ‘men’ and 
‘women’ should better be understood as referring exclusively to the associated status kinds. See Saul ([2006]) for a 
discussion.  
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and are subject to a number of specific expectations, opportunities, and constraints. In 
fact, Hacking makes quite clear that it is this network of social relations which mediates 
classificatory feedback in the kind schizophrenia.  
How does biased conceptualisation threaten the natural kind status of human 
interactive kinds? In order for a kind to function as a natural kind, we need to have a 
sound theoretical understanding of the causal processes that underpin the properties 
associated with it. We want to know not only that members of the category typically 
behave in certain ways, but also why they typically behave in these ways and under 
which circumstances we should expect them to behave differently. However, when we 
conceive of a human interactive kind solely in terms of the base kind, without 
considering the associated status, causal pathways associated with the status disappear 
out of sight. If these causal pathways have a significant influence on the properties of 
classified individuals, undetected biased conceptualisation will prevent us from 
developing the causal understanding that is necessary to use human interactive kinds 
as natural kinds. In other words, although biased conceptualisation does not 
necessarily affect all human interactive kinds, or necessarily preclude a proper 
understanding of all those kinds affected by it, it is an unacknowledged potential 
hindrance to using human interactive kinds as natural kinds and, as such, needs to be 
addressed in the debate. 
The previous discussion suggests that the categories men and women have been 
severely affected by biased conceptualisation. Here, the focus on a biological 
conceptualisation concealed the role social positioning played in producing observed 
differences. Accordingly, scientists prioritised the search for biological determinants 
of the observed differences (such as brain size and shape, or hormones) over the search 
for social ones (such as socialisation or social structural constraints). The same might 
have been true for schizophrenia, if Hacking’s description is correct and changing 
medical beliefs did play a significant role in the changing symptom profile. In this case, 
it seems that conceptualising schizophrenia as a cluster of symptoms or as a 
neurological disorder, without taking into account the associated status, obscured 
changes in medical beliefs about schizophrenia as a possible cause for the changing 
symptom profile.  
In several places, Hacking remarks on our tendency to ‘biologize’ or ‘geneticize’ 
human interactive kinds (see, for instance, Hacking [2006], [1995b], p. 353). Although 
these remarks resonate somewhat with my idea of biased conceptualisation, they are 
misleading in that they suggest that biased conceptualisation always necessarily 
involves human kinds which are conceptualised as biological. This is not the case—
kinds which are explicitly conceptualised as social can be hybrid kinds affected by 
biased conceptualisation, too. Other passages in Hacking align with this idea. He 
cautions that the classification woman refugee is associated with social and material 
factors that affect the characteristics of women thus classified ([1999], pp. 10–1), and 
that our tendency to think of children who watch television as a ‘species’, might reify 
the kind child viewer of television via classificatory feedback effects ([1999], p. 27). 
Unfortunately, Hacking does not say anything more concrete about effects of biased 
conceptualisation in each case. But we can illustrate the idea with the example of the 
kind unemployed. Here, the base kind, understood as being without paid work but 
available to work, is explicitly defined with respect to social institutions. Nevertheless, 
being unemployed is also associated with a status which, among other things, involves 
social stigma. If the social stigma of people classified as unemployed has a crucial 
influence on their properties, biased conceptualisation that only considers the base 
kind could lead to gaps in our understanding. There is some evidence that this has 
taken place with respect to health disparities between employed and unemployed 
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people. O’Donnell et al. ([2015]), for instance, found evidence that stigma negatively 
affects the psychological and physical health of unemployed people, but also note that 
there is very little existing research on this hypothesis. Former studies, they argue, 
instead focus on factors like financial strain, or lack of time structure, social contact, 
and activity—all factors typically associated with the base kind rather than the status 
of the hybrid kind unemployed. As O’Donnell et al. observe, this perspective not only 
provides a limited theoretical understanding of the existing health disparities, it also 
obscures potential interventions, such as changing public perceptions of 
unemployment or teaching skills for coping with stigmatization.  
 
4.2  Studying social status 
If biased conceptualisation was the only potential problem with using human 
interactive kinds as natural kinds, the solution would be fairly straightforward: simply 
identify the associated status and understand what feedback effects it has on classified 
individuals. Unfortunately, there are reasons to believe that understanding these 
statuses and their feedback effects is anything but straightforward. As Jaakko 
Kuorikoski and Samuli Pöyhönen ([2012], p. 191) point out, although much of social 
science is limited to describing patterns of social life, only an understanding of the 
underlying mechanisms allows scientists to make inferences about counterfactual 
scenarios and enables them to extrapolate findings to new contexts and identify 
effective interventions. Hence, in order to be able to explain and predict how the status 
associated with a classification affects classified individuals, we need to understand not 
only the social and psychological mechanisms that mediate feedback effects, but also 
the mechanisms that stabilise and modify the status over time. There are several factors 
that potentially complicate this understanding. 
Consider first the feedback-mediating mechanisms. Several philosophers have 
provided extensive discussions of these mechanism, often illustrated with examples 
supported by social scientific research (Drabek [2014]; Kuorikoski & Pöyhönen [2012]; 
Mallon [2016]; Murphy [2006]). Accordingly, I will not repeat their points here, but 
simply point to the diversity of causal pathways that this literature has identified. 
Mallon ([2016], pp. 68–89), for instance, distinguishes three main pathways by which 
classifications can lead classified individuals to change their behaviour: intentional 
change of behaviour, automatic change of behaviour, and environmental construction. 
Each of these, he suggests, can occur via several different causal pathways. Intentional 
change, for instance, can happen via change in salient possibilities for action, or via 
strategic or non-strategic reasoning. Environmental construction involves processes 
such as transmission of culture and institutions, or modifications of the material and 
spatial environment. In addition to that, Kuorikoski and Pöyhönen ([2012], pp. 196–
7) point out that classificatory feedback can operate with or without the individual 
being aware of the classification. They discuss examples showing how classificatory 
feedback can happen without awareness, through processes such as the alteration of 
the practical reasoning of classified individuals or the modification of other people’s 
expectations towards classified individuals.  
This literature suggests that, although it is possible to identify and, to some extent, 
empirically investigate the social mechanisms that mediate classificatory feedback, 
these mechanisms are quite varied and complex. To complicate things further, 
different mechanisms may pull in different directions, thus amplifying or attenuating 
their respective effects. For example, on the intentional pathway, the effect of me being 
classified as a criminal might be that the classification troubles me, so that I resolve to 
make special efforts to act lawfully in the future. At the same time, my efforts to do so 
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might be frustrated by the structural and material constraints that affect me as someone 
classified as a criminal. I might, for instance, no longer be eligible for a variety of jobs, 
which makes earning a living via illicit activities a more compelling option.  
In addition to that, attempts at understanding and predicting classificatory feedback 
are complicated even further by the fact that the social meanings associated with 
classifications may vary both synchronically and diachronically. At any given time, a 
classification can mean different things in different contexts and interact with other 
classifications. Consider again the example of men and women. In this case, the 
conceptualisation and investigation of the associated status is relatively advanced, 
arguably more so than in any other human interactive kind. In the last few decades, a 
comprehensive literature that theorises gender as a status kind has emerged (see, for 
instance, Oakley [1972]; MacKinnon [1989]), followed by systematic empirical 
investigation into the associated determinants of differences between men and women. 
Fields like social psychology, for instance, now provide ample empirical support for 
activists’ and critical theorists’ long-held claim that psychological differences between 
men and women cannot be explained purely in terms of biology, but require 
consideration of their differing treatment and positioning in society (see, for instance, 
Eccles [1987]; Eagly [1987]; West & Zimmerman [1987]; Spencer et al. [1999]). 
However, simultaneously with these developments, a discussion has emerged as to 
whether a unitary category of women’s gender is a useful category at all, given how 
racial, cultural, and class differences influence the positioning and experiences of 
individuals classified as women (see Spelman [1988]; Butler [1999]; Mikkola [2006]; 
Stoljar [2011]). At the centre of this discussion is the observation that the specific social 
position that an individual occupies in virtue of being classified as a woman varies 
greatly depending on a number of other factors. These include the background culture 
in which the classification is used, other classifications that are applied to the 
individual, as well as not classification-induced social and economic factors.9 The 
debate suggests that it might not always be possible to identify a unitary status 
associated with a certain classification. Instead, in order to understand the causal 
processes that support a human interactive kind, one needs to understand how the 
classification affects individuals in different circumstances and in interaction with other 
classifications. 
In addition to that, the status associated with a classification may change over time. 
Again, the problem is not that the social meanings of classifications change at all, but 
that they change over time in ways that are difficult to explain and predict. Why did 
the Stonewall riots in 1969 in New York lead to a gay liberation movement that 
radically changed the status kind associated with the category homosexual? Historians 
can discuss the merits of different hypothesis to explain this event and its impact, but 
they have little way to empirically decide between them. Events like the rise of the gay 
liberation movement are the result of complex social and political processes that 
possibly involved a unique constellation of a myriad of factors that cannot be 
reproduced or tested under laboratory conditions. As a result, social scientists cannot 
explain or predict changes of the meanings associated with human kinds with any 
certainty.  
These are both familiar points in the discussion of social scientific methodology, 
yet their relevance to the question whether human interactive kinds can function as 
natural kinds has not been explicitly addressed in the extant literature. In particular, 
they suggest that status kinds themselves may often make poor candidates for natural 
                                                 
9 By ‘not classification-induced factors’ I mean factors that do not depend on the individual being recognised as of a 
certain kind, although the factors might be causally associated with a certain kind. For instance, many people are poor 
because they are working class, but their being poor is not (or not primarily) due to being classified as working class. 
17 
 
kinds. If we cannot explain and predict the social meanings associated with human 
classifications, we are in no good position to explain their respective classificatory 
feedback effects, or to make reliable inferences about what feedback effects the 
classification is going to bring about under different circumstances. Hence, although 
the above discussion does not establish that human interactive kinds can never 
function as natural kind categories—there might be cases where we have a firm 
understanding of the associated status, and the mechanisms facilitating feedback are 
few and well-studied—it does provide some reasons to be cautious.  
 
5  Conclusion  
In this paper, I discussed Hacking’s heavily criticised suggestion that human interactive 
kinds cannot be natural kinds. I suggested that there might be more to Hacking’s claim 
than his critics acknowledge, albeit not for the reasons Hacking identifies. Hacking 
suggests that interactivity is primarily a phenomenon of instability of the set of 
properties associated with a kind. His critics rightly object that interactivity thus 
understood does not preclude human interactive kinds from being natural kinds. I 
argued that both sides miss the core threats to natural kind status because they 
presuppose an oversimplified understanding of the epistemic role of natural kinds. 
Natural kinds are not simply vectors for projections and generalisations, but analytic 
tools that incorporate assumptions about the causal mechanisms which constitute the 
kind. At the same time, human interactive kinds tend to have an ontological structure 
which compromises their ability to fulfil this epistemic role. They can often be 
understood as hybrid kinds, consisting of a base kind and an associated status kind, 
and are subject to several features that potentially threaten their status as natural kinds. 
These include the tendency towards biased conceptualisation, the diversity and 
complexity of mechanisms mediating classificatory feedback, and most importantly, 
the fact that there is reason to think that status kinds themselves make poor candidates 
for natural kinds. 
What are the methodological implications of my account? Recall that the discussion 
so far has been characterised by two methodological positions. According to Hacking, 
the phenomenon of human interactive kinds supports the difference thesis. For him, 
the fact that human interactive kinds cannot be natural kinds implies that we need 
radically new and different methods for understanding these kinds. His critics, by 
contrast, seem to support the unity thesis. By insisting that human interactive kinds 
can be natural kinds, they suggest that investigating these kinds is just ‘science as 
usual’—we do not need methods that radically differ from those of the natural 
sciences. My own account locates the truth somewhere in between these two positions. 
Although there might be cases in which we understand the associated status and its 
feedback effects well enough to use a human interactive kind as a natural kind, there 
is reason to believe that some human interactive kinds will be unsuitable as natural 
kinds. Yet this need not imply that investigating these kinds requires a radically new 
methodology. Coming back to the example of the kinds men and women, extant work 
in this area suggests that many researchers are perfectly well aware of the challenges 
and have found different ways of responding to them. After the crucial initial step of 
theoretically distinguishing the status kind gender from the base kind sex, feminist 
theorists have offered an understanding of gender as diverse and context-specific (see, 
for instance, Spelman [1998]; Butler [1999]), or suggested to understand gender along 
a specific politically relevant dimension (see, for instance, MacKinnon [1989]; 
Haslanger [2012]). These accounts of gender might not have (and are often not 
intended to have) the inductive power that we typically associate with natural kinds. 
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But they might nevertheless provide an adequate understanding of how particular 
social mechanisms produce properties associated with men and women in specific 
contexts, or elucidate aspects of gender that are of central importance in emancipatory 
politics. In other words, contrary to Hacking’s claim, the challenges of human 
interactive kinds need not demand a radically new scientific methodology. In many 
cases, a better engagement with the resources that are already on offer will do. 
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